

NWC  
IRP  
93-2

ARCHIVAL COPY

**FOCUSED DECISION MAKING IN AN  
AMBIGUOUS WORLD: DEFINING CRITERIA  
FOR THE USE OF U.S. FORCE ABROAD**

Colonel David E. Graham, USA  
The National War College, 1993

**NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY  
LIBRARY  
SPECIAL COLLECTIONS**

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE <b>1993</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED <b>00-00-1993 to 00-00-1993</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Focused Decision Making in an Ambiguous World: Defining Criteria for the Use of U.S. Force Abroad</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>National War College, 300 5th Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 20319-6000</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT <b>see report</b>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>35</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

**FOCUSED DECISION MAKING IN AN AMBIGUOUS WORLD:  
DEFINING CRITERIA FOR THE USE OF  
U.S. MILITARY FORCE ABROAD**

INTRODUCTION:

The United States is currently undergoing two periods of simultaneous transition - the first involving significant changes in the international environment, the second centered around a transformation in the U.S. domestic political agenda. Within the context of these transitional events, the Clinton Administration is now being forced to deal with exceptionally complex situations involving the potential use of U.S. military force without the benefit of a workable framework for use of force decision making. In the view of the author, the absence of such a framework deprives the country's leadership of a critically essential tool of national security policy. Without further delay, this administration must move toward the establishment of a use of force philosophy that will enable it to engage in focused decision making concerning the commitment of U.S. force abroad in the ambiguous international environment of today's world.

At the very core of this issue lie two basic questions:

Is the U.S. prepared to signal its commitment to remain engaged globally, in a post-Cold War world, by continuing to use military force abroad?

If so, when, where, and in what manner will the U.S. engage in the use of such force in the future?

This paper will examine efforts currently under way within the U.S. to respond to these questions. In doing so, it will focus on recent use of force pronouncements made by the Bush and Clinton administrations. Upon completing this analysis, the author will then offer both a use of force philosophy and clearly defined, "interest driven", criteria which may be used in addressing contemporary use of force scenarios.

#### The Weinberger Use of Force Criteria

In examining the current debate concerning the appropriate use of U.S. force abroad, it is useful to recall that previous efforts have been made to articulate use of force criteria. The most recent and widely cited criteria are those set forth by then Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, in 1984:

(1) No commitment of forces to combat overseas unless the engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.

(2) Any insertion of combat forces should be done wholeheartedly with the intention of winning. There should be no commitment of forces unless we are willing to commit enough resources to achieve our objectives. The use of limited resources to achieve limited aims is appropriate.

(3) A commitment of forces requires clearly defined political and military objectives. We should know how these forces can achieve the objectives.

(4) The relationship between the size, composition and disposition of committed forces and our objectives must be continuously reassessed and adjusted if necessary. When conditions and objectives change during a conflict, so must our combat requirements.

(5) Prior to a commitment of American forces, there should be some reasonable assurance of public and congressional support.

(6) The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.<sup>1</sup>

Formulated in the context of Cold War events - the U.S. military involvement in Grenada, the terrorist bombing of the U.S. Marines' barracks in Beirut, and active U.S. engagement in Central America, these use of force criteria were clearly intended to limit those situations in which U.S. forces would become involved.

In a running, and often public, debate with Secretary Weinberger, then Secretary of State George Shultz viewed these criteria as far too restrictive. In his view, the numerous regional and local conflicts then underway in the world - "gray-area challenges" - affected important U.S. and Western interests and demanded U.S. attention.

...[M]uch of the developing world is torn by the continuing struggle between the forces of moderation and the forces of radicalism - a struggle actively exploited and exacerbated by the Soviet Union. It is absurd to think that America can walk away from such challenges....[T]he United States...must meet its responsibility as a defender of freedom, democratic values and international peace....[W]e have learned that to maintain peace and preserve freedom we have to be strong, and...we have to be willing to use our strength.

We must be wise and prudent in deciding how and where to use our power; the United States will always seek political solutions to problems. Such solutions will never succeed, however, unless aggression is resisted and diplomacy is backed by strength.<sup>2</sup>

The Weinberger - Shultz debate concerning the appropriate use of U.S. military force was never fully resolved. Nevertheless, the "Weinberger Criteria" were often looked to as a reasonable formula for use of force decision making. Freed now, however, of a mindset dictated by East-West confrontation, it is essential that we define a use of force philosophy and implementing criteria that move us beyond the Weinberger approach and provide current U.S. policy makers with a decisional framework more suited to the vagaries of the post-Cold War world.

## The Bush Administration And The Use of U.S. Military Force Abroad

### Secretary Cheney and the Use of Force

In January 1993, the outgoing Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, expressed his views concerning the continuing leadership role to be played by the U.S. in the world and noted the criteria upon which he would base future U.S. use of force deployments abroad:

There will not be peace and security in the world without U.S. leadership.... There isn't anyone else to

do it. And that leadership depends on U.S. military capability.... So any strategy...that does not proceed from that set of assumptions - that the U.S. ultimately is the one that has to provide leadership in moments of grave international crisis and that capability rests on our military forces - is doomed to fail.<sup>3</sup>

In keeping with this view, Cheney indicated that his use of force criteria would differ from those put forward in 1984 by Secretary Weinberger. While endorsing Weinberger's requirements that, before U.S. forces are committed, the mission must be clear, winnable, and in the national interest, Cheney stated that he would eliminate the requirement that a mission have broad public support. In his words, "Sometimes you may not be able to identify that support, but you will need to act".<sup>4</sup>

These criteria offer the genesis of a post-Cold War U.S. use of force policy. "The U.S. will continue to exercise leadership, militarily, in the world - even in the absence of broad public support - by deploying U.S. military forces to accomplish clearly identified and achievable objectives deemed to be in the nation's national interests".

#### President Bush's West Point Address

Challenged by numerous "opinion leaders" to articulate his criteria for the use of force abroad, President Bush turned to this issue in delivering the final foreign policy address of his administration on January 5, 1993, at West Point.<sup>5</sup>

Affirming his belief in the need for U.S. leadership in world affairs, the President cautioned, nevertheless, that leadership must not be confused with either "unilateralism" or "universalism". In driving home this point, he noted:

We need not respond by ourselves to each and every outrage of violence. The fact that America can act does not mean that it must. A nation's sense of idealism need not be at odds with its' interests, nor does principle displace prudence...[T]he United States should not seek to be the world's policeman. There is no support at home or abroad for us to play this role.... We would exhaust ourselves in the process, wasting precious resources needed to address those problems at home and abroad that we cannot afford to ignore.<sup>6</sup>

Having sounded this cautionary note, however, the President then focused his attention on the issue of the use of force, prefacing his remarks with the observation that: "At times, real leadership requires a willingness to use military force, and force can be a useful backdrop to diplomacy, a complement to it or, if need be, a temporary alternative."<sup>7</sup>

Elaborating on this concept, the President spoke to the use of U.S. military force in Iraq, asserting the use of force there to implement Security Council resolutions to be in the interest of both the U.S. and the world community.

Turning to Somalia, he contended that:



The United States should not stand by with so many lives at stake, and when a limited deployment of U.S. forces, buttressed by the forces of other countries and acting under the full authority of the United Nations, could make an immediate and dramatic difference and do so without excessive levels of risk and cost.<sup>8</sup>

Then, focusing on the situation in the former Yugoslavia, the President acknowledged:

There are...important humanitarian and strategic interests at stake there, but up to now it's not been clear that the application of limited amounts of force by the United States and its...friends and allies would have had the desired effect, given the nature and the complexity of that situation.<sup>9</sup>

If the President had concluded his remarks at this point, we would have been left with relatively generalized - perhaps somewhat contradictory - observations from which to discern the Bush use of force philosophy. Perhaps sensing this, he quickly moved on to warn his listeners of the futility of attempting to structure "rigid" criteria for the future use of U.S. military force abroad:

Military force is never a tool to be used lightly or universally. In some circumstances, it may be essential; in others, counterproductive. I know that many people would like to find some formula, some easy formula, to apply, to tell us with precision when and where to intervene with force.

Anyone looking for scientific certitude is in for a disappointment. In the complex new world we are entering, there can be no single or simple set of fixed rules for using force.

Inevitably, the question of military intervention requires judgement. Each and every case is unique. To adopt rigid criteria would guarantee mistakes involving American interests and American lives and would give would-be troublemakers a blueprint for determining their own actions. It could signal U.S. friends and allies that our support was not to be counted on. And similarly, we cannot always decide in advance which interests will require our using military force to protect them.

The relative importance of an interest is not a guide. Military force may not be the best way of safeguarding something vital, while using force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important, but less than vital. (Emphasis supplied.)<sup>10</sup>

Was the President sounding a call for an end to "interest analysis" in use of force decision making? My belief is that the former President would say, "No. Prioritizing the nation's interests is a worthwhile exercise. Remember, however, that attaching labels (and therefore, importance) to perceived U.S. interests simply cannot provide, in today's world, definitive guidance regarding whether the U.S. will or will not use military force in any given situation."<sup>11</sup>

Having spoken to the demands of his critics that he establish rules for the governance of military force, the President now shifted gears. Though averse to the formulation of specific use of force "criteria", i.e., rule making, he expressed no such disdain for the utility of articulating "principles" designed to "inform" use of force considerations. In his words:

... [T]o warn against a futile quest for a set of hard and fast rules to govern the use of military force is not to say that there cannot be some principles to inform our decisions. Such guidelines can prove useful in sizing and indeed shaping our forces, and in helping us think our way through this key question.<sup>12</sup>

The President then set forth the core elements of his use of force philosophy:

Using force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice.

Once we are satisfied that force makes sense, we must act with the maximum possible support. The United States can and should lead, but we will want to act in concert, where possible, involving the United Nations or other multinational groupings.

The United States can and should contribute to the common undertaking..., but others should also contribute militarily,...providing combat or support forces, access to facilities or bases, or overflight rights. And...others should contribute economically.<sup>13</sup>

Then - perhaps mindful of the recently expressed views of his Secretary of Defense - the President hedged his bets.<sup>14</sup> Citing the use of U.S. force in Panama and the Philippines, he noted that "A desire for international support must not become a prerequisite for acting.... Sometimes a great power has to act alone."<sup>15</sup>

The President next spoke to the final, and very critical, elements of his use of force philosophy:

...[In] every case involving the use of force, it will be essential to have a clear and achievable mission, a realistic plan for accomplishing the mission, and criteria no less realistic for withdrawing U.S. forces once the mission is complete. (Emphasis supplied.)<sup>16</sup>

The "Bush Doctrine" regarding the use of U.S. military force abroad may thus be summarized as follows:

(1) The U.S. is prepared to use military force as a complement to, or a temporary alternative for, diplomacy.

(2) The U.S. will not make use of force determinations on the basis of rigid criteria that are exclusively "interest driven".

(3) In keeping with this fact, the U.S. will not uniformly determine and articulate, in advance, those national interests which will be protected by the use of military force.

(4) Within this framework, the U.S. will consider the use of force when:

- \* the stakes warrant the use of force;<sup>17</sup>
- \* force can be effective;
- \* no other policies - political, diplomatic, or economic - appear likely to be effective;
- \* the application of force can be limited in scope and in time;
- \* the potential benefits justify the potential costs;
- \* it is possible to frame a precise and realistically achievable mission - and an equally realistic plan for the accomplishment of the mission; and
- \* realistic criteria can be established for determining mission completion and the concomitant withdrawal of U.S. forces.

(5) The U.S. is prepared to take the lead in use of force situations, but prefers to act in concert, when possible, with the U.N. or alternative multinational coalitions.

(6) The U.S. is prepared to contribute its proportionate share of manpower and assets to common use of force activities; however, other states must also contribute militarily or economically.

(7) The U.S. reserves the right to engage in the unilateral use of force.

### Media Reaction to the West Point Address

Print media commentators tended to view the President's effort to define his use of force philosophy as lacking in sophistication and simplistic in its brevity. From The New York Times, these words: "Mr. Bush outlined several principles guiding the use of force, but said that beyond common sense and moral imperatives there were no real guidelines to govern when American troops should intervene abroad".<sup>18</sup>

The Washington Post noted: "Sometimes the United States will intervene, President Bush offered...yesterday, and sometimes, it won't. But when? When the stakes warrant, when the benefits outweigh the costs, when there's a plan to get in and a plan to get out. On these criteria, Mr. Bush put American troops into Iraq and Somalia and...chose not to dispatch troops to Yugoslavia".<sup>19</sup>

In the words of Richard Cohen, writing in The Washington Post, "George Bush is not much for doctrine.... So it was characteristic of Bush to come up with the non-doctrine

doctrine.... Bush attempted at West Point to state under what circumstances the United States would intervene militarily abroad. His doctrine came down to this: It depends."<sup>20</sup>

Finally, William Safire observed, in The New York Times, "Only after a rejection at the polls did Mr. Bush stop to think about his world view. In the end, his prudence still outweighed his principle.... But his closing thoughts at West Point offer his successor the rudiments of a much-needed "Clinton Doctrine".<sup>21</sup>

In the view of the author, the pundits - intentionally or otherwise - have overlooked or dismissed much of substance in the President's West Point address. A thoughtful analysis of the President's remarks clearly reflects that the Bush use of force philosophy constitutes far more than simply "rudiments" upon which his successor might build. Indeed, he has articulated a basic framework for prudent and workable use of force decision making in the future.

#### The Clinton Administration And The Use Of U.S. Military Force Abroad

Though President Clinton entered his presidency in the hope that he could focus primarily upon a deteriorating American economy, events in Somalia, Iraq, and Bosnia have already forced

the new President and his aides to grapple with the appropriate use of military force.

As a candidate, President Clinton asserted that "Military power still matters.... I will use that strength where necessary to defend our interests".<sup>22</sup> He promised, as well, that in employing military force, he would act "...together where we can, alone where we must."<sup>23</sup> And, in his Inaugural Address, the President appeared to stand ready to use force for purposes other than solely the protection of U.S. national interests. "When our vital interests are challenged...."or the will and conscience of the international community is defied, we will act with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with force when necessary".<sup>24</sup> (Emphasis supplied).

Since his inauguration, the President has not directly addressed the issue of the use of force, nor has he elaborated upon the meaning or intent of his inaugural remarks. Members of the President's cabinet have discussed this matter, however, and have expressed views that may potentially set this Democratic administration on a course that differs substantially from that of its predecessors.

Within the Clinton Administration, it has been the Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, who has spoken the most extensively on the use of force issue. In his testimony before the Senate Armed

Forces Committee, he offered these thoughts concerning the situation in Bosnia: "If the world does nothing about what's going on in Bosnia, what kind of a signal does that send to other places in the former Soviet Union...? ...[I]f the world does nothing about Bosnia, what message does it send about a willingness to sit back and let these things happen...?"<sup>25</sup>

These comments, considered in conjunction with previous speeches and policy papers authored by Secretary Aspin during the past three years, provide some insight into his views concerning when and how the U.S. armed forces should be used abroad in a post-Cold War world.

In a speech delivered in September, 1992, Mr. Aspin suggested that U.S. military leaders had become overly reluctant to engage in military operations unless they could be assured of a quick and certain victory through the use of overwhelming force.<sup>26</sup> He, in contrast, implied that he was convinced that force could prudently be used for limited purposes. In Bosnia, he noted, limited air strikes might be employed - not for the purpose of defeating Serb forces - but to inflict pain on the Serb leadership sufficient enough to force it to halt military operations.<sup>27</sup>

Mr. Aspin also spoke to the issue of the limited use of force in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services



Committee. Though several senators expressed reservations concerning the Secretary's views, Mr. Aspin chose not to outline the specific circumstances under which he would recommend the use of military force in Bosnia - or elsewhere in the world.<sup>28</sup>

Testifying shortly after Mr. Aspin, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Warren Christopher also asserted that the incoming Clinton Administration would be more willing to consider the use of force in Bosnia than had the Bush Administration. Having articulated this position, however, he went on to address the use of military force in rather conservative terms: "I do believe that the discreet and careful use of force in certain circumstances, and its credible threat in general, will be essential to the success of our diplomacy". Then, in a cautionary tone, he added: "We cannot respond ourselves to every alarm. I want to assure the American people that we will not turn their blood and treasures into an open account for use by the rest of the world".<sup>29</sup>

The views expressed by Mr. Aspin and Mr. Christopher would indicate that, at this juncture, a consensus regarding the appropriate use of U.S. force abroad does not exist within the Clinton Administration. The details of Mr. Clinton's own views concerning this issue remain unclear. "It's not quite a doctrine - more an attitude," an advisor has said.<sup>30</sup> Other aides have indicated that President Clinton is unlikely to attempt to codify

his use of force approach in an all-embracing set of principles - a "Clinton Doctrine". One such advisor notes: "The American people are pragmatic. They look at each set of circumstances as they arise. If you try to impose the straitjacket of doctrine, you'll only come to grief".<sup>31</sup> In the words of Morton Halperin,<sup>32</sup> "We're stuck with intervening in ambiguous situations. That makes it difficult to come up with substantive criteria that work".<sup>33</sup>

### Focused Use Of Force Decision Making In An Ambiguous World

U.S. national security policy in the post-Cold War era cannot be based on a resigned acceptance that the U.S. will be "forced" to intervene militarily around the world by entities and events beyond its control. As noted by President Bush, "Our choice as a people is simple. We can either shape our times or we can let the times shape us...".<sup>34</sup> Now - more than ever - America's leadership must demonstrate an awareness of the need to exercise carefully crafted and focused decision making regarding the future use of U.S. military force abroad.

In order to shape its use of force philosophy, the Clinton Administration must address those questions posed by the author in the introduction to this paper.

Is the U.S. prepared to signal its commitment to remain engaged globally, in a post-Cold War world, by continuing to use military force abroad?

If the U.S. is prepared to use force abroad, when, where, and in what manner will the U.S. exercise such force in the future?

Continued leadership in global affairs requires that the U.S. stand ready to engage in the future use of military force. On this issue, there is consensus.<sup>35</sup>

It is the "when", "where", and "how" components of post-Cold War use of force decision making that generate substantial debate. Even those who debate these matters, however, do so within the bounds of a commonly shared belief that such decisions must be "interest driven". That is, agreement does exist that U.S. military force should be used abroad for the purpose of promoting or protecting U.S. "national interests".<sup>36</sup> Rather, it is the ongoing argument over what these interests are, the relative importance of these interests, and the circumstances under which these interests should be promoted or protected by the use of military force that must be resolved.

In the view of the author, the Bush Administration has articulated a use of force philosophy that can, with further refinement, serve as an effective decision making framework for current U.S. policy makers.

In January 1993, the Bush Administration identified the following U.S. national security interests:

- \* The survival of the U.S. as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
- \* A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.
- \* Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.
- \* A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.<sup>37</sup>

Though broad in nature, these national interests represent a starting point from which informed use of force decisions can be made. Within the context of these broadly defined interests, however, more specific U.S. national interests must be identified - interests that reflect the domestic and international political realities of today's world.<sup>38</sup>

In view of these realities, the U.S. must limit its national interests and political objectives to achievable goals. Thus, in defining these interests, the U.S. will be required to demonstrate both the patience and political maturity to selectively establish long-term, permanent interests, rather than "interests du jour" driven by misplaced emotionalism, TV images, and the widely diverse agendas of the international community.

True leadership embodies the ability to exercise informed judgment in determining those situations which merit the investment of increasingly limited U.S. political, economic, and military capital. It also carries with it an awareness that, as our military forces and the budgets that support them are reduced,<sup>39</sup> we can serve neither as the world's policeman nor its social worker.<sup>40</sup> There can be no headlong rush to cure the world's misery or to champion democracy and human rights on a global basis through force of arms.<sup>41</sup> The U.S. public would not support such an agenda.<sup>42</sup> The international community would soon come to resent and oppose U.S. intervention.

In keeping with these realities, the author recommends that the U.S. now limit the expenditure of its national security assets to the protection or promotion of the following national interests:

- (1) Protection of the U.S. homeland;
- (2) Preservation of prosperity through the maintenance of an open international economic environment;
- (3) Assurance of access to Persian Gulf oil;
- (4) Prevention of wars involving "great powers" in Europe and the Far East;
- (5) Protection of states with which the U.S. continues to maintain defense relationships (specifically, South Korea and Israel);
- (6) Preventing/retarding the spread of weapons of mass destruction; and
- (7) Promotion of democracy and human rights abroad.<sup>43</sup>

These, alone, are the U.S. national interests that should "drive" decisions regarding the use of U.S. military force. This

is not to say, however, that force should be used to protect or promote even these interests at all times - in all places. Judgments as to when, where, and how U.S. force should be committed abroad can be made only on the basis of use of force criteria that enable the decision maker to assess the "intensity" of a particular interest at any given point in time.<sup>44</sup> The operative question thus becomes:

"Does the protection or promotion of a specifically identified national interest - when all relevant factors are taken into consideration - merit the use of military force?"<sup>45</sup>

Prior to moving to the formulation of such use of force criteria, it is essential to note that a decision to restrict U.S. national interests to only those identified above serves, in and of itself, to limit the future use of U.S. military force. A U.S. interest in the prevention of wars in Europe and the Far East involving only the great powers of those regions would rule out, for example, U.S. use of force in conflicts between smaller states and in all forms of civil wars, such as that currently being waged in Bosnia. Only if a "Bosnian-type" conflict threatens to expand into a war involving a great power should a U.S. interest - and thus the issue of a potential use of U.S. force - arise.

Additionally, if informed decisions regarding the use of U.S. force abroad are to be made, U.S. policy makers must fully

understand the substantive and legal differences that distinguish conventional use of force situations from "humanitarian relief operations", "peacekeeping activities", and the newly resurrected concept of "humanitarian intervention". Far too often, now, these terms are mistakingly being used, interchangeably.

In this regard, the promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights, though worthy U.S. national interests, should not be systematically championed by U.S. military power. U.S. interventions, either individually or collectively, in the internal affairs of other states for purported "humanitarian" or "democratic" purposes will inevitably invoke memories of past "just wars" and contravene well established norms of international law.<sup>46</sup>

Accordingly, the U.S./U.N. action currently under way in Somalia should not be viewed as a precedent setting example of "humanitarian intervention", undertaken under the use of force provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter for the purpose of fostering democracy or righting the human rights abuses of a constituted government. This operation was originally initiated for the sole purpose of providing "humanitarian relief" - a completely different concept in nature and in law. Given this fact, U.S. ground forces were to deploy to Somalia only for the purpose of safeguarding deliveries of food and medicine.<sup>47</sup> And even this very limited "U.N. - determined" activity was made

possible because of the absence of any form of recognized  
Somalian government. "Operation Restore Hope is, in fact, an  
anomaly.

Moreover, less U.S. decision makers grow enamored with the  
concept of engaging in global U.N. "humanitarian relief"  
operations, it would be prudent to pause and consider the history  
of the U.S. Somalian experience - the constantly changing nature  
of the original mission, the reluctance and/or inability of the  
U.N. to assume responsibility for the operation, and its growing  
cost in terms of both American lives and capital.<sup>48</sup>

Finally, the author has intentionally not dealt with the  
issue of potential U.S. participation in future U.N. or coalition  
"peacekeeping" operations. If such operations entail, in fact,  
"peacekeeping" - vice "peacemaking" - activities, the critical  
use of force issues addressed in this paper need not arise.

It is essential, however, that the current administration  
remain alert to the fact that, in today's international  
environment, well intentioned "peacekeeping" efforts may quickly  
transition into conventional use of force "peacemaking"  
situations. And - less there be confusion concerning this issue:  
"Peacemaking" is the conventional use of military force - in fact  
and in law. This reality must enter into any U.S. decision to  
play an active role in future peacekeeping operations. Indeed,



U.S. policy makers would be well advised to both consider the use of force criteria set forth in this paper in making such decisions and to insist upon the formulation of mission, fiscal, and command and control agreements prior to the deployment of U.S. forces.

An "Interest Driven" Use of Force Philosophy  
And Implementing Criteria

With these facts in mind - and drawing upon the previously articulated "Bush Doctrine" regarding the use of force<sup>49</sup> - the author recommends the use of the following "interest driven" use of force philosophy and implementing criteria in assessing contemporary use of force scenarios.

(1) The U.S. is prepared to use military force as a complement to, or a temporary alternative for, diplomacy.

(2) The U.S. will make use of force determinations on the basis of clearly defined criteria crafted to enable decision makers to assess whether - in view of the specifically identified U.S. national interest at issue - it is necessary or, if not necessary, prudent to use force to protect or promote the interest concerned.<sup>50</sup>

(3) The U.S. will not articulate, in advance, specific situations in which it will or will not consider the use of force to protect or promote its national interests.<sup>51</sup>

(4) Within this framework, the U.S. will consider the use of force when:

\* a situation arises in which a specifically identified U.S. national interest is involved;

\* no other non-use of force policies - political, diplomatic, or economic - have proven to be or appear likely to be effective;

\* the application of an appropriate<sup>52</sup> degree of force is likely to be effective;

\* the potential benefits justify the potential human and fiscal costs;<sup>53</sup>

\* it is possible to frame a precise and realistically achievable military mission, based on clearly defined political objectives - and an equally realistic plan for the timely<sup>54</sup> accomplishment of this mission; and

\* realistic criteria can be established for determining mission completion and the concomitant withdrawal of U.S. forces.

(5) The U.S. is prepared to act in concert with the U.N. or alternative multinational coalitions in dealing with use of force situations - subject to previously agreed fiscal and command and control arrangements.<sup>55</sup>

(6) The U.S. is prepared to contribute its proportionate share of manpower and assets to commonly agreed use of force activities; however, other states must also contribute militarily and/or economically.

(7) The U.S. reserves the right to engage in the legitimate unilateral use of force in order to protect or promote its national interests.

As previously noted, the author recommends that the U.S. not resort to the use of military force for purposes of "humanitarian intervention," i.e., the promotion of democracy or the protection of human rights. If, indeed, U.S. forces are to be used for humanitarian purposes, these actions should be limited to low-risk, multinational, relief operations undertaken for purely humanitarian reasons. In these situations, a slightly

modified version of the relevant criteria set forth by President Bush in his discussion of the deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia should guide U.S. actions.

When many lives are at stake, and no international relief agency is capable of dealing with the situation, the U.S. will be prepared to consider the limited deployment of U.S. forces when these personnel, buttressed by the forces of other countries, and acting under the full authority of the United Nations, could make an immediate and dramatic difference, and do so without excessive levels of risks and cost.<sup>56</sup>

Again, however, for the reasons indicated above,<sup>57</sup> the author would advise U.S. decision makers to exercise caution in undertaking these forms of U.N. missions - and to do so only after agreement has been reached concerning the specific nature of the mission and appropriate fiscal and command and control arrangements have been codified.

### Conclusion

The author has set forth a use of force philosophy and implementing criteria that may serve as a decision making framework for the current administration as it seeks to reach judgments concerning the commitment of U.S. force abroad. This philosophy and these criteria are offered with the full knowledge that no set of "rules" can guarantee success or serve as an adequate substitute for sound judgment based on experience and common sense. Absent the use of this framework as a starting

point, however, future U.S. decisions regarding the use of military force will inevitably lack the focus essential to the implementation of an effective, affordable and consistent national security policy capable of both safeguarding America's national interests and ensuring its leadership role in the years to come.

David E. Graham  
COL, USA

## NOTES

1. Summarized from News Release, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), November 28, 1984.
2. George P. Shultz, "Shaping American Foreign Policy: New Realities and New Ways of Thinking", Foreign Affairs Spring 1985: 717-719.
3. Jim Wolfe, "Cheney urges successor to keep military strong", Army Times 11 January 1993: 8.
4. Wolfe 8.
5. The President had earlier delivered a valedictory address at Texas A&M University on December 15, 1992, during which he had very broadly dealt with the use of force issue.
6. President George Bush, Address to the Corps of Cadets, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., 5 January 1993, printed in Defense Issues, Vol. 8, No. 1, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs): 1-2.
7. Bush 2.
8. Bush 2.
9. Bush 2.
10. Bush 2-3. In the author's view, the President's thesis would have been better served had he asserted that "the relative importance of an interest" cannot serve as an exclusive guide to the use of military force.
11. The scale of priorities most frequently assigned to U.S. national interests follows: (1) survival interests - the very existence of the nation is in peril; (2) vital interests - probable serious harm to the security and well-being of the nation will result if strong measures, to include military action, are not taken within a short period of time; (3) major interests - potential serious harm would come to the nation if no action is taken to counter an unfavorable trend abroad; and (4) peripheral (minor) interests - little, if any, harm to the nation will result if a "wait and see" policy is adopted. For a detailed discussion of the subject of "interest analysis," see Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted: United States National Interests in the 1980's (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1985) 1-17.

The reader should be aware of the fact that the term, "vital interests," is commonly, but mistakenly, used in referring to U.S. "national interests" as a whole. This term is best understood as but one sub-set of such interests. Additionally, the reader should bear in mind this scale of "interest priorities" as the author speaks to the necessity for criteria for the future use of U.S. military force abroad to be "interest driven."

12. Bush 3. In the author's view, the President's forced distinction between "criteria" (to be rejected) and use of force "guidelines" is a distinction without a difference. The President's "guidelines" are, in fact, use of force "criteria".

13. Bush 3.

14. See text, p. 5, for Cheney's comments.

15. Bush 3.

16. Bush 3. The use of force philosophy articulated by President Bush at West Point finds strong support in the views expressed on this subject by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Writing in Foreign Affairs, General Powell noted:

Objectives for which we use...force can range from hurting an enemy enough so that he...ceases to do the thing that is endangering our interests...to unseating the enemy's government....

...[T]o help with the complex issue of the use of...force, some have turned to a set of principles or a when-to-go-to war doctrine.... There is, however, no fixed set of rules for the use of military force. To set one up is dangerous.

...[W]e need to evaluate the circumstances. Relevant questions include: Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined and understood? Have all other nonviolent policy means failed? Will military force achieve the objective? At what cost? Have the gains and risks been analyzed? How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences?

...When the political objective is important, clearly defined and understood, when the risks are acceptable, and when the use of force can be effectively combined with diplomatic and economic policies, then clear and unambiguous objectives must be

given to the armed forces. These objectives must be firmly linked with the political objectives.

We can and do operate in murky, unpredictable circumstances. But we also recognize that military force is not always the right answer. If force is used imprecisely or out of frustration rather than clear analysis, the situation can be made worse.

...Where we should not use force, we have to be wise enough to exercise restraint.

Colin L. Powell "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs Winter 1992-1993: 37-41.

17. In the author's view, the "stakes" to which the President refers are, by definition, "interest driven". That is, given the particular national interest involved - and when all relevant factors are considered - is the use of force warranted?

18. Michael Wines, "Bush, in West Point Valedictory, Offers Principles on Use of Force", New York Times 6 January 1993, sec. A: 1.

19. "American Intervention", editorial, The Washington Post 6 January 1993, sec. A: 16.

20. Richard Cohen, "Summing Up the Bush Doctrine", The Washington Post 7 January 1993, sec. A: 31.

21. William Safire, "When To Use Force", New York Times 7 January 1993, sec. A: 23.

22. Doyle McManus, "Questions Raised on How Clinton Will Use Force", Los Angeles Times 13 January 1993, sec. A: 3.

23. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Clinton's Somalia Choice", The Washington Post 8 January 1993, sec. A: 17.

24. President Bill Clinton, Presidential Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., 20 January 1993. Printed in The Washington Post 21 January 1993, sec. A: 26.

25. Pat Towell, "Aspin Brings Activist Views To A Changed World", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 9 January 1993: 80.

26. Towell 82. Among others, General Colin Powell has often been associated with this "overwhelming force" school of thought. This "buzz word" misrepresents General Powell's views on this subject, however. In his words, "Decisive means and results are always to be preferred, even if they are not always possible....

If our objective is something short of winning - as in our air strikes into Libya in 1986 - we should see our objective clearly, then achieve it swiftly and efficiently." Powell 40.

27. Towell 82. In Mr. Aspin's view, two recent developments support the viability of such limited operations: (1) No longer locked in a mortal rivalry with the former Soviet Union, the U.S. can intervene in a trouble spot without fear that anything less than a total U.S. victory would be perceived as a sign of weakness; (2) Precision-guided "smart bombs" make it easier to destroy such targets as command posts, power grids and communications nodes "...with little, if any, loss of U.S. lives and with a minimum of collateral damage and loss of civilian lives on the other side." General Powell has challenged this concept. "We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. When the "surgery" is over and the desired result is not obtained, a new set of experts comes forward with talk of just a little escalation...." Powell 40.

28. Towell 80. Robert C. Smith, R-N.H., noted: "If force is used imprecisely and out of frustration rather than clear analysis, the situation can be made worse." John McCain, R-Ariz., asked: "What do we do...if we launch these air strikes and...find ourselves with several American pilots being held captive, somewhere in Siberia?" McCain also questioned whether knocking out a power grid "...would somehow dissuade the Serbians from carrying out the...atrocious acts they're carrying out today." McManus 80.

29. Doyle McManus, "Clinton More Willing to Consider Force in Balkans, Christopher Says", Los Angeles Times 14 January 1993, sec. A: 2.

30. McManus, Questions 3.

31. McManus, Questions 3.

32. Mr. Halperin appears to be the leading contender for the position of the newly created post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Human Rights. See Barbara Starr, "White House begins DoD nominations", Jane's Defence Weekly 13 March 1993: 15.

33. McManus, Questions 3. The lack of a consensus within the Clinton administration regarding the appropriate use of force has increasingly become a subject of discussion in the print media. Typical of such articles is one dealing with the use of force in Bosnia. "From the start, Clinton has appeared torn between campaign promises and private sentiment on the one hand and the seeming imperatives of prudent diplomacy and domestic politics on



the other.... Clinton's policy lacks...strategic self-confidence.... The...administration remains split. A number of senior officials...have favored stronger action. Others...have been less enthusiastic.... The result has been a contradictory policy." Patrick Glynn, "Not Bush", The New Republic, 15 March 1993: 10.

34. "Neither Hide nor Go It Alone," editorial, Los Angeles Times 17 December 1992, sec. A: 10.

35. Statements to this effect have been articulated by a wide range of policy and opinion makers - President Bush, Secretary Cheney, General Powell, President Clinton, Secretary Christopher, Secretary Aspin, members of Congress, and members of the media.

36. As reflected in comments cited in the text of this paper, the use of U.S. military force to promote or protect U.S. national interests is an issue upon which both the past and current administrations agree.

37. "Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy", Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 1993: 3.

38. Some foreign policy professionals would narrowly define the circumstances under which U.S. national interests should mandate the use of U.S. military force abroad. See Ted Galen Carpenter, "The New World Disorder", Foreign Policy, No. 84, Fall 1991: 24-

39. Some take a broader perspective. See Alberto R. Coll, "America As The Great Facilitator", Foreign Policy, No. 87, Summer 1992: 47-66. Still others advocate the use of force to promote and protect "a new humanitarian order". See David J. Scheffer, Richard N. Gardner and Gerald B. Helman, Post-Gulf War Challenges to the U.N. Collective Security System: Three Views on the Issue of Humanitarian Intervention, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace, 1992.

39. For a discussion of the reduction in U.S. military manpower, see American Sentinel 21 February 1993: 3. For an analysis of the reduction in the DoD budget, see National Journal 27 February 1993: 517.

40. Ted Carpenter appears to have been the first commentator to have referred to the U.S. as a potential world "social worker". See Carpenter 24.

41. For an excellent discussion of the dangers inherent in use of force intervention for humanitarian purposes, see Stephen John Stedman, "The New Interventionists", Foreign Affairs - The Year Ahead 1993: 1-16.

42. For a detailed examination of growing populist isolationism in the U.S., see William Schneider, "The Old Politics and the New World Order", Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, Eagle In A New World (New York: Harper Collins, 1992) 35-68. "[W]hen it comes to policy, the isolationist impulse begins to intrude, particularly when a policy becomes difficult or costly." Schneider 63. A recent USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll revealed that almost 80% of Americans polled felt that the U.S. should not become more involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina. USA Today 1 March 1993, sec. A: 9.

43. These "limited" national interests essentially parallel those articulated by Robert J. Art in an excellent article in which he proposes a future defense policy for the U.S. See Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense", International Security Spring 1991: 9. Other well reasoned arguments have also been put forward for the adoption of more narrowly focused, "permanent" U.S. national interests. See James Schlesinger, "Quest For A Post-Cold War Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs - The Year Ahead 1993: 17-28. The author does not discount the fact that unforeseen events, beyond the scope of these limited national interests, may well require the use of U.S. military force abroad. These situations must be addressed on a case-by-case basis - but, as an exception, - not as a rule.

44. The "intensity" of a national interest depends upon the level of concern the U.S. may have regarding a particular interest at a given time and the extent to which it deems it necessary to defend or enhance this interest through the use of force. See Nuechterlein 9.

45. Or - to paraphrase President Bush: "Do the 'stakes' warrant the use of force?"

46. For example, a humanitarian and political interest in seeking resolutions to ongoing conflicts within sovereign states exceeds any responsibilities or rights to intervene in such situations conferred by relevant international law. Indeed, interventions in such conflicts violate the specific U.N. Charter provision (Article 2, paragraph 7) prohibiting intervention in the domestic affairs of member states. The author is aware that a counter (pro-humanitarian intervention) argument can be made. For example, Michael Reisman has long contended that the U.N. has the duty to promote and encourage self-determination and human rights. Thus, he argues, individual states are entitled to uphold these rights by intervening to enforce them. In such cases, Art. 2(4) of the U.N. Charter (which prohibits aggression or threats of aggression) should not be construed to bar unilateral actions against repressive regimes. In the view of the author, this return to the Justinian concept of "just war" is subject to significant abuse - providing powerful states with an almost unlimited "right" to overthrow governments adjudged

"unfit" to govern. For an analysis of this issue, see Lloyd N.Cutler, "The Right to Intervene", Foreign Affairs Fall 1985: 105-107.

47. Sharon La Franiere, "Wider U.N. Role Seen in Somalia", The Washington Post November 30, 1992, sec. A: 1.

48. The Somalian operation is said to be costing the U.S. (DoD) \$30 million to \$40 million, daily. See Stuart Auerbach, "Tired Marines, Eager to Return Home, Await U.N. Takeover in Somalia", The Washington Post 1 March 1993, sec. A: 11. For a discussion of the operational, administrative, and financial difficulties encountered by the U.S. in Somalia, see "Operation Restore Hope (less)?", editorial, New York Daily News 25 February 1993, sec. A: 14; Joshua Hammer, "Somalia: The GI Blues", Newsweek 15 March 1993: 51; "Mission Accomplished in Somalia", editorial, The Washington Post 4 March 1993, sec. A: 24.

49. See text, pp. 10-11.

50. When a U.S. national "survival" interest is not in issue, it may or may not be "necessary" to engage in the use of force to protect lesser U.S. national interests - even an interest considered to be "vital" in nature. However, in assessing the use of force criteria set forth in (4), decision makers may, nevertheless, deem it "prudent" to exercise force in the protection or promotion of such interests.

51. To do so would, in the words of General Powell, "...destroy the ambiguity we might want to exist in our enemy's mind regarding our intentions". Powell 38.

52. An "appropriate" degree of force refers to the need to deploy the "sufficient" degree of U.S. military force required to provide the U.S. with a realistic opportunity to resolve a particular situation in an effective and decisive manner. Such an approach augers against "incrementalism".

53. This is, perhaps, the essential criterion. The protection or promotion of the particular national interest in issue must be worth the resulting loss in American lives - and capital. In the words of General Powell, "...[T]he use of force should be restricted to occasions where it can do some good and where the good will outweigh the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue". Powell 40. Moreover, decision makers must be alert to the fact that the American people, Congress, and the media will engage in a daily "cost-benefit" analysis.

54. This criterion attempts to ensure the avoidance of political/military "quagmires". The accomplishment of the mission in issue must be possible to achieve within a "reasonable" period of time. It can be neither ill-defined, nor

open-ended. Again, the American public will refuse to sanction these forms of uncertainty.

55. In the author's view, these forms of previously agreed arrangements are essential to the successful participation of U.S. forces in U.N./coalition use of force actions.

56. See text, p. 7. The underlined text reflects the author's changes in the "humanitarian relief" criteria articulated by President Bush.

57. See text, p. 22, and endnote 48.